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The Illogic of National Health Care Reform

A new consensus has emerged among health policy analysts, political
pundits, and elected officials in recent years over the prospects for national
health care reform. Abandoning traditional notions of American exceptionalism,
the leading journals in the medical profession now hail the dawn of a new era in
health policy making. Not since the 1970s, pundits argue, has the United States
been presented with such an auspicious opportunity to enact a universal health
insurance system. Indeed, a quick perusal of recent writings in both the medical
community and the popular press would most likely convince persons
unfamiliar with the vagaries of the American political process that the enactment
of a comprehensive national health insurance is almost a foregone conclusion
over the next decade. As the Journal of the American Medical Association
editorialized in 1991:
If the Iron Curtain can be lifted, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and
East and West Germany politically reunited, all quite rapidly,
because it was the right thing to do and the time had come -- surely
we in this rich and successful country can manage to provide basic
medical care because it too is the right thing to do, and the time has
come ... An aura of inevitability is upon us.1
This new optimism is especially startling because it clashes with more
traditional explanations of health care politics, which sought to account for the
absence of national health insurance in the United States. Comparative studies of
welfare states typically account for the reluctance of the United States to embrace
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George D. Lundberg, "National health care reform: An aura of inevitability is upon us," Journal of the

American Medical Association 265 (1991), pp. 2566-67.
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universal health care in terms of "American exceptionalism."2 In this view,
America's unwillingness to enact national health insurance can be traced to the
peculiar historical and structural features of U.S. political institutions and a deep
seated hostility towards "big government."3 While Paul Starr argues that the
absence of a strong socialist movement and the conservative agenda of the
American labor movement limited the appeal of universal health insurance at the
turn of the century, health care reform efforts also succumbed to the traditional
weakness and fragmentation of the American state.4 In the absence of strong
bureaucratic leadership or unified party control, health care reform fell victim to
the organized opposition of the medical profession. Intertwined with these
institutional explanations of American exceptionalism are arguments which
identify the persistence of a highly individualistic political culture that
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Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, The Development of Welfare States in Europe and North America

(Transaction Publishers, 1981); Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, The Politics of
Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
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As James A. Morone argues in The Democratic Wish (New York: Basic Books, 1990), the unwieldy

combination of Americans' traditional distrust of government and a recurring faith in the ability of scientific
expertise seen in reform proposals from the progressive era to the Great Society results in an incoherent
approach to policymaking which creates new institutional structures to meet each problem, yet fails to
invest policymakers with adequate authority. See also Samuel Huntington's excellent discussion of
American political culture's role in shaping policy choices in American Politics: The Promise of
Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
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emphasizes self-reliance, hard work, and a suspicion of government as a
principal obstacle to comprehensive health care reform.5
As Victor Fuchs argues, the absence of national health insurance in the
United States is understandable given Americans' traditional distrust of
government, the heterogeneity of the US population, a long standing
commitment to voluntarism and philanthropy, and the lack of a strong sense of
"noblisse oblige."6 Insulated from the true cost of medical care by private,
employer- sponsored health insurance plans, the middle class has remained on
the sidelines of debates over national health insurance since the 1950s. Although
the inability of traditional voluntary solutions (e.g., Blue Cross plans, business
health care coalitions) to cope with declining access to health services and
rampant cost inflation seemingly favors reform, cultural barriers to reform
remain. However, if Fuchs is correct, why do an increasing number of politicians
and pundits now proclaim that a "window of opportunity" has opened to enact
national health insurance in the 1990s?
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Seymour Lipset, Continental Divide (Routledge, 1990); Steven E. Bennett and Linda Bennett, Living with

Leviathan (Topeka: University Press of Kansas, 1990). Paul M. Sniderman and Michael Hagen provide an
excellent discussion of the impact of individualism and moralism on public attitudes in Race and Inequality
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1985)..
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Victor Fuchs, "National Health Insurance Revisited," Health Affairs, 10 (Winter 1991), pp. 14-16. The

classic account of American political culture and public policy making, however, appears in Louis Hartz,
The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955). For a more contemporary
discussion of US political culture, see Seymour M. Lipset's analysis of the impact of political culture on
public policy in the United States and Canada in Continental Divide (New York: Routledge, 1990).
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Sources of the new optimism
Several recurring themes have redefined the conventional wisdom about
the prospects of health care reform. First, and perhaps foremost, is the belief that
public dissatisfaction with the existing health care system has broken down
traditional barriers which sidelined past reform efforts. In particular, continued
health care inflation, a rising number of persons without health insurance,
growing frustrations with the "job lock" associated with employer-sponsored
health insurance, and new constraints on patient choice as more Americans
enroll in "managed care" plans have fueled dissatisfaction among providers and
consumers of health services alike. As a recent article in The Nation argued,
What makes this moment more pregnant with possibilities than
other times in the history of the struggle for health care is that it no
longer involves only the needs of the poor. As elections from
Bernie Sanders' notable victory for Vermont's only Congressional
seat in 1990 to Pennsylvania Senator Harris Wofford's recent comefrom-behind victory ... have shown, health care is a winning issue
in middle class constituencies.7
These sentiments were echoed in numerous popular journals and
newspapers in the wake of the "political earthquake" triggered by Pennsylvania
1991 Senate race, where exit polls found that 50% of respondents cited national
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Andrew Kopkind, "Seizing the historic moment," The Nation, 253 (December 16, 1991) pp. 768-71. For

additional examples, see Robert Pear, "Election puts spotlight on health care," The New York Times, 141,
(November 12, 1991), pp. A7, A20; [editorial], "Ringing: The Health Care Alarm," The New York Times
(November 8, 1991), p. A14.
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health insurance as one of the two most important issues affecting their vote.8 If
correct, the consolidation of public support for national health insurance could
prove to be decisive, finally making universal access to health care a "middle
class issue" with broad popular appeal.
The populist appeal of health care reform also played a prominent role in
the 1992 presidential campaign, as both Democratic and Republican candidates
wooed voters with a variety of reform proposals. The appointment of former
Wofford campaign manager James Carville as the principal strategist for the
Clinton campaign ensured that health care reform would become one of the
Democrats' principal policy themes during the fall campaign. Indeed, health care
reform received more media attention during the 1992 presidential campaign
than at any time since the early 1970s. After watching each of the contenders for
the Democratic nomination exchanged salvos over the merits of various health
care reform proposals during the spring and summer, popular support for
expanded access to health care and government efforts to control rising health
care costs increased steadily, prompting many pollsters to argue that health care
had become one of the most important issues for voters in evaluating candidates.
In this context, many observers interpreted the election of Bill Clinton as a
significant opportunity for health care reform. In sum, a growing number of
elected officials, physicians, hospital executives now share the view that "the
election of a new president amid a sense of a health care crisis and high hopes for
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Janice Castro, "Paging Dr. Clinton," Time (January 18, 1993), p. 24; Paula Dwyer, "A roar of discontent:

voters want health care reform -- now," Business Week (November 25, 1991), p. 29.
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change has created the best opportunity for fundamental reform during the last
quarter century."9
This optimistic assessment was also shared by the Democratic leadership
in the 103rd Congress. As Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D, ME)
confidently proclaimed after the election, "I believe that we [will] in this
Congress enact comprehensive health care reform."10 This view was echoed by
Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D, WV), who claimed that "Bill Clinton was elected to enact
comprehensive health care reform." In the House, Rep. Henry Waxman, (D, CA)
asserted that "President Clinton's election represents a mandate to carry out his
commitment for universal coverage and effective cost containment."11 Thus, in
the eyes of many of the principal players in Congress, the election of a
Democratic president and the end of divided government suggested that the
"aura of inevitability" that began in the late 1980s would finally yield action in
the Democratically controlled 103rd Congress.
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Philip Caper, "Managed Competition that Works," Journal of the American Medical Association 269:

2524-26. As one senior policymaker with the American Hospital Association argued, "Not since the
enactment of Medicare and Medicaid has the political process been so ripe for decisive action on health
care." Quoted in Christine McEntee, "Clinton's Next Move: Scoping Out the White House on Health Care
Reform," Hospitals (January 20, 1993), p. 23.
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Julie Rovner, "Clinton has Rx for Reform--Will Congress Take the Cure?," Congressional Quarterly

Weekly Report (November 28, 1992), pp. 3714.
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Both quotations are drawn from Marybeth Burke, "Thirteen Views from the Hill," Hospitals (January 20,

1993), pp. 16-20.

The Illogic of National Health Care Reform

Second, reformers contend that growing public dissatisfaction with the
existing health care system has found a receptive audience in Congress, where
increased public cynicism and hostility towards the institution have made
members increasingly attentive to their constituents' concerns. On the surface,
Congressional support for health care reform is fast approaching a critical mass;
strong endorsements from the Democratic leadership and influential Republican
members in both chambers promises to break the legislative gridlock which has
frustrated action on a national urban policy, deficit reduction, and other
domestic policy problems in recent years.12 Indeed, Mark Peterson described
the proliferation of health care reform proposals from the end of the 101st
Congress through the 102nd Congress as "a gathering social movement." In
years to come, Peterson suggests that the "first session of the 102nd Congress
may well be remembered as the foundation year when the movement towards
comprehensive health care reform began in earnest, possibly when the impetus
for change became irresistible." This optimistic appraisal also reflects the
emergence of a broad-based coalition for health care reform in recent years, as
many members not sitting on committees with jurisdiction over the financing
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Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell declared health care reform his most important priority

following the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1990, while House Ways and Means Chairman Dan
Rostenkowski devoted the committee's 1990 annual retreat to health care reform proposals. Previous
committee retreats yielded the tax reform act of 1986 and the welfare reform package. Support for reform
in the 102nd Congress was also bipartisan, with more than 20 different proposals introduced by Democrats
and Republicans.
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and delivery of health care (e.g., Sen. Robert Kerrey, D, NE) have become active
participants in the quest for reform.13
Third, many supporters of comprehensive health care reform often
assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that the return of national health insurance
to the political agenda is proof of its political feasibility. A crisis mentality has
characterized health care debates in recent years, replete with predictions that
the US health care system is "ailing," "bordering on collapse," or "poised on the
verge of a ... meltdown."14 Reports of an imminent catastrophe in the US health
care system have been popularized by both the print and broadcast media
brought the news of an emerging "crisis" in the nation's health care system home
to millions of Americans and raised the consciousness of elected officials.15 Rep.
Ron Wyden (D, SD) summed up the views of many of his colleagues when he
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Mark Peterson, "Momentum Towards Health Care Reform in the U.S. Senate," Journal of Health

Politics, Policy, and Law 17: 553-75.
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George D. Lundberg, "National health care reform: The aura of inevitability intensifies," Journal of the

American Medical Association 267 (1992), p. 2524.
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The Gallup Organization's sixth annual California Health Care Poll in October 1992 found that "82

percent of Californians agreed that there is a health care crisis, 87 percent said they believed the health care
system needs reform, and 76 percent are worried about affordability in the future," Mark Hagland, "Experts
Agree on this: It was a Banner Year for Health Care Polls," Hospitals (December 20, 1992), pp. 32-33.
Reports of an impending health care crisis have appeared with regularity in newspapers and weekly news
magazines in recent years. See, among others, Joyce Castro, "Condition Critical," Time (November 25,
1991), pp. 34-42; Susan Dentzer, "How to Fight Killer Health Costs," US News and World Report, 111,
(September 23, 1991), p. 50.
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argued that rising health care costs are "gobbling up everything in sight. They're
a wrecking ball in our economy."16
Media portrayals of the health care crisis focus on "scary" numbers, such
as millions of Americans without health insurance, health care's rising share of
the gross national product, and rapidly rising insurance premiums for middle
class families as motivations for policy makers to address health care reform
sooner, rather than later. Unlike previous decades, when the nature and
magnitude of the health care "problem" was more limited, would be reformers
contend that health care's growing share of the gross national product, a growing
burden on businesses as a result of employee fringe benefit costs, and consumers'
increasing out of pocket costs for health services have pushed elected officials
towards a critical "threshold" which could produce dramatic policy change.17
Finally, pundits claim that the changing configuration and orientation of
interest groups in the health policy arena as evidence have weakened previous
obstacles to reform. The American Medical Association (AMA), once a bastion of
conservatism widely credited with the defeat of national health insurance
proposals in the 1930s and 1940s, has tempered its rhetoric in recent years and is
pushing its own reform package. Furthermore, unlike in previous decades, the
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Burke, "Thirteen Views," p. 18.
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As Daniel Patrick Moynihan notes in "Defining Deviancy Down," The American Scholar 62 (Winter

1993), pp. 17-30, society's definition of policy problems changes significantly over time. The consequences
of the deinsitutionalization movement in mental health policy, growing acceptance of nontraditional family
structures, and increased tolerance for violent crime since the 1960s suggest that the growing severity of a
policy problem is insufficient to impel corrective public action.
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AMA's ability to speak authoritatively on behalf of its members is suspect.
Although organizations such as Physicians for a National Health Plan (PNHP)
have attracted little support within the medical profession, reformers argue that
providers' mounting dissatisfaction with existing methods of payment and their
continuing frustration with the "micromanagement" of medical practice by peer
review organizations, insurers, and hospital administrators that accompanied
federal and state efforts to control health care costs in the 1980s made them more
receptive to proposals for systemic reform.18 In addition, while neither the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce nor the National Association of Manufacturers actively
campaigned for systemic health care reform during the 1970s, the impact of
rising health care costs on American corporations' profitability and global
competitiveness, coupled with the growing importance of health care benefits in
labor-management negotiations, raised the business community's consciousness
about the need for government action.19 Endorsements for health care reform
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Physicians for a National Health Plan was supported by more than 3,000 of the American Medical

Association's members in 1992. The mere presence of PHNP, however, contrasts starkly with the 1970s,
when the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons and the Congress of County Medical Societies
both opposed national health insurance reform on the grounds that it would lower the quality of care and
exacerbate inflation in the health sector. Although the AMA did not actively oppose reform in this period,
its "Medicredit" proposals espoused a voluntary solution which would provide tax credits for individuals to
purchase health insurance which provided a minimum set of benefits.
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See Uwe Reinhardt, "Health Care Spending and American Competitiveness," Health Affairs, 8 (Winter

1989) and Carl J. Schramm, "Living on the Short Side of the Long Run," Health Affairs (Spring 1990), pp.
162-64. For a discussion of the increased salience of health care costs in labor-management negotiations,
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proposals from such traditional opponents are held up as evidence that the most
active and influential members in health policy making circles are now, if not
openly supportive of national health insurance, certainly not predisposed to
mount a serious challenge to comprehensive reform.
In addition, while providers and payers continue to be over-represented
in health policy debates, over the past two decades new advocacy groups
changed the character of health politics, resulting in a policy network more open
to participation than in the past.20 By 1993, virtually every organization and
interest group with a stake in purchasing or providing health care services had
taken a position on health care reform. More than 500 different groups, from
lobbyists for the elderly to manufacturers of durable medical equipment and
pharmaceuticals besieged Congressional committees and President Clinton's
Health Care Reform Task Force with testimony, position papers, and op-ed
pieces since November, 1992.21 In the eyes of would-be reformers, the efforts of
Families USA, the American Association of Retired Persons, Public Citizen,
Consumers' Union, and a host of other groups, coupled with strong support in
Congress and the mass public, have created a political climate more hospitable to

see Walter B. Maher, "Back to Marketplace Basics," Health Affairs, 9 (Spring 1990), pp. 169-70 and
William M. Davis, "Collective Bargaining in 1990: Health Care Cost a Common Issue," Monthly Labor
Review (January 1990), pp. 3-18.
20

John Tierney, "Organized Interests in Health Politics and Policymaking," Medical Care Review, 44

(Spring 1987), pp. 89-118.
21

See Peterson, "Momentum Towards Health Care Reform," p. 554, and Alissa Rubin, "Special Interests

Stampede to be Heard on Overhaul," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (May 1, 1993), pp. 1081-84.
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comprehensive health care reform than at any point in the recent past . Indeed,
even conservatives have accepted the "inevitability" of health care reform. After
the 1992 election, conservative political commentator Kevin Phillips argued that
"if the White House comes up with something that's well-researched and well
presented on the Hill, then it will be passed."22 As the Journal of the American
Medical Association (JAMA) editorialized in 1992, "the reality of reform seems
assured. The only questions now are what, how much, how soon, how
incremental, how complete, how effective, and how long lasting."23
The Political Realities of Health Care Reform
Upon closer examination, however, the assumptions underlying this
optimistic view rest on an untenable logic: trends in public opinion, changes in
Congress, and the continued relevance of institutional and ideological obstacles
to reform makes significant progress towards enacting national health insurance
in the U.S. unlikely in the foreseeable future. Reflecting on past efforts at health
care reform is sobering for its prospects in the present. Proposals for national
health insurance have appeared and disappeared from the political agenda since
the first decades of the twentieth century.24 Although reform was held to be

22

Quoted in Mark Hagland, Terese Hudson, and Kevin Lumsdon, "Observers See Clinton Moving Quickly

on Health Care Reform," Hospitals (November 20, 1992), pp. 12-13.
23

Lundberg, "National health care reform: The aura of inevitability intensifies," p. 2521.

24

Talk of a health care crisis is one of the perennial themes in American social policy. Indeed, much of the

rhetoric from the 1970s could be transported, unaltered, into the current debate. In 1978, Senator Edward
Kennedy argued that the health care system was "strained to the breaking point by runaway costs," while
House Ways and Means Committee Chair Al Ullmann (D, OR) declared in 1974 that "I am personally
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imminent in each era, hindsight confirms the importance of separating political
rhetoric from reality. After the first national health insurance proposals were
defeated following America's entry into World War I, the issue resurfaced again
in the 1930s, the 1940s, and the 1970s. Despite the enthusiasm for reform during
the 1970s, efforts to enact a national health insurance program floundered amid
concerns over the cost of implementing universal coverage, growing cynicism
about government's ability to solve social problems and a corresponding urge to
"get government off of the peoples' backs," and the inability of the various
supporters of health care reform to agree upon a compromise proposal.25 As we
shall see, these constraints have changed little over the past decade.
Public support for health care reform. According to the new conventional
wisdom, health care reform, and national health insurance in particular, has
become a winning issue with voters. Taken at face value, the surge in support
for national health insurance presages the passage of a national health insurance

persuaded ... that the Congress can no longer postpone major decisions to assure the availability of health
services to all persons in the United States."
25

John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Scott Foresman, 1984), p. 9. As Theodore

Marmor notes in "American Health Politics, 1970-the Present: Some Comments," Quarterly Review of
Business and Economics 30 (1990), p. 32, the appearance of Senator Edward Kennedy's book, In Critical
Condition (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972) reflected a consensus among policy makers in the early
1970s that the U.S. health care system required fundamental change. However, despite an emerging
consensus over the need for reform in the early 1970s, partisan and ideological divisions over the proper
form of a national health insurance program and the scope of covered benefits sidetracked reformers'
efforts.
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program in the not-too-distant future. The electoral appeal of health care reform
heralded by many pollsters, pundits, and politicians in the wake of Harris
Wofford's surprise win in 1991 and its prominent place in the 1992 presidential
campaign, however, is limited. To accurately assess the public's desire for health
care reform, we must delve beneath the surface of the poll results, for most
analyses of public attitudes towards health care reform share a number of
important shortcomings.26
First, many observers assume that increased public support for national
health insurance will lead to changes in public policies. The effect of public
opinion on policy is most evident when the magnitude of the opinion changes
are large and move in the same direction over time; policy congruence is highest
on those issues which are most salient to the mass public.27 Herein lies the
problem for those who expect public support for national health insurance to
propel reform efforts in the years to come, for health care was not cited by
Americans as one of the nation's top priorities in recent years.28 While "health
care was an important concern among American voters, ... the economy was the
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For a comprehensive review of recent public opinion polling data on health care reform, see Robert J.

Blendon, Tracey S. Hyams, and John M. Benson, "Bridging the Gap Between Expert and Public Views on
Health Care Reform," Journal of the American Medical Association 269:2573-78.
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Science Review, 77 (March 1983), p. 181 and Alan D. Monroe, "Consistency Between Public Preferences
and National Policy Decisions," American Politics Quarterly 7 (January 1979), pp. 3-19.
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Insurance," New England Journal of Medicine 323 (July 19, 1990), p. 209.

The Illogic of National Health Care Reform

dominant issue that determined voting patterns and ultimately the election of
Bill Clinton."29 Indeed, preelection polls conducted during the supposed "surge"
in public support for national health care reform in 1991 found that health care
trailed behind concerns about the nation's economic performance, the federal
budget deficit, unemployment, and drugs as "the most important issue in
determining which presidential candidate they intended to vote for."30 The
public's continued concerns about stagnant economic performance are also
sobering for health care reformers, for support for new domestic policy
initiatives is strongly influenced by citizens' economic expectations.31 As Durr
demonstrates in his analysis of domestic policy sentiment in the postwar era,
periods in which the public has a pessimistic view of the economy are associated
with conservative policies, while optimistic economic expectations lead to
greater support for costly domestic programs and expanded social benefits.
In addition, while policy makers regard health care reform as an essential
deficit reduction strategy and as a means to increase national competitiveness
and spur economic growth, recent surveys suggest that public concerns about
health care, and its support for health care reform stem from different sources.32
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Robert Blendon et al., "The Implications of the 1992 Presidential Election for Health Care Reform,"

Journal of the American Medical Association 268 (December 16, 1992), pp. 3371-75.
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The Gallup Poll Monthly, 314 (November 1991), p. 8.
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Robert H. Durr, "What Moves Policy Sentiment?," American Political Science Review 87:158-70. As a

result, Durr argues (p. 167) that economic expectations "play a critical role in the opening and closing of the
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Blendon, Hyams, and Benson, "Bridging the Gap," pp. 2573-74.
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As Blendon and his coauthors note, "the public does not view rising health care
costs as a growing threat to the government or the economy." In fact, nearly 70%
of Americans felt that the U.S. was spending too little on health care; when asked
to choose between controlling costs or increasing access to services as a goal for
health care reform, the public chose the latter by more than a 2-1 margin.
To complicate matters even further, the public remains divided over what
type of health care reform it wants, sending mixed signals to decision-makers.
Recent surveys revealed that the public was almost evenly split in its preference
for "managed competition" proposals and regulatory controls; of those surveyed,
only persons aged 18-29 years strongly supported the Clinton administration's
proposal.33 Earlier polls revealed similar divisions in public support for pay or
play proposals mandating that employers provide coverage for their employees
and a single payer system modeled after the Canadian experience. Public
opinion surveys also uncovered uncertainty about the public's willingness to foot
the bill for a national health insurance program. Proponents of national health
insurance reform often point to poll results documenting that more than 50% of
all Americans support universal health insurance, even at the cost of higher
taxes, as evidence of a deep seated desire for change. Aggregate support for
health care reform, however, is deceptive; when asked how much of a tax
increase they would be willing to pay, the popularity of national health

33

Robin Toner, "How Much Health Care Reform Will the Patient Go Along With?" New York Times

(March 7, 1993), p. D1.
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insurance proposals falls markedly.34 Although majority of those polled (54%)
favored adopting "national health insurance, financed through new taxes, which
would cover all Americans," nearly a third opposed any new taxes to finance
universal coverage, while an additional 49% were unwilling to pay more than
$200 a year to provide universal coverage.35 While voters' willingness to
support higher taxes to pay for health care reform varies by the type of tax
increase proposed to fund it, only 24% of those surveyed on election night in
1992 were willing to pay an additional $50 per month to finance coverage for all
Americans.36
Recent polls also uncovered lingering public doubts about the quality of a
government- managed health care system. More than half of the respondents
expressed concerns about restrictions on their freedom of choice in selecting
doctors and other health providers, and nearly half (47%) were concerned that
national health insurance would exacerbate delays in receiving medical
services.37 In addition, only 23% felt that the government would "do the better
job managing a national healthcare system"; 61% believed that responsibility
should be left in the hands of private industry.38 Since the proposals which have
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The Novalis Corporation, "The State of American Healthcare", Medical Benefits, (February 29, 1992), p.

9.
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Health Insurance Association of America, "National Attitudes Toward Health Care Financing Reform,"

Medical Benefits, 9 (February 29, 1992), p. 12).
36

Blendon et al., "The Implications of the 1992 Presidential Election," pp. 3373-74.
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Health Insurance Association of America, "National Attitudes," p. 12.

38

Novalis Corporation, "The State of American Healthcare," p. 9.
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garnered the most Congressional support require both higher taxes and a sizable
expansion of government's role in the provision of health services, lingering
doubts about government's capability to manage the delivery of health care
services constitutes a significant obstacle to reform.
The public's satisfaction with its own health services also spells trouble for
reformers hopeful of riding a wave of public discontent to enact national health
insurance. Although 85% of those polled agreed that the current health care
system "needs reforming and change" and 91% believed that the system was "in
crisis," two thirds described themselves as "very satisfied" with the services
provided by their own physician and less than 25% were displeased with the
care they received during their last stay in the hospital.39 This satisfaction with
one's personal experiences with the health care system but dissatisfaction with
the system itself mirrors "the Congress problem," in which individuals approve
of their own representative's performance, but distrust and disapprove of
Congress as an institution.40

39

Frank Newport and Jennifer Leonard, "The Crisis in National Health Care," The Gallup Poll Monthly,

311 (August 1991), pp. 4-9.
40

See Everett Carl Ladd, "The Congress Problem," The Public Interest, No. 100 (Summer 1990), pp. 57-

67. A more detailed consideration of the impact of members' behavior in their home districts on policy
making can be found in Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, 2nd ed.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, The Personal
Vote (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), and Richard Fenno, Home Style (Glenview, IL:
Scott, Foresman, 1978).
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Applied to health care, individuals' confidence and satisfaction with their
own providers and community hospitals is juxtaposed against their belief that
the system has broken down. In 1990, the reelection of House members at a near
record level in the midst of a purported anti-incumbent revolt confirmed what
students of Congressional elections had suspected for some time: while the
public favors change and "new blood" in Washington, this support for change
dwindles when it threatens their own representative or senator.41 As earlier
experiences with health planning programs demonstrated, the public favors
wringing "waste" and "excess capacity" from the health care system to control
costs as long as service cuts and "efficiency" measures fall elsewhere and do not
involve their hospitals or doctors. Dissatisfaction with the present health care
system will be difficult to translate into collective action as long as most
Americans are covered by, and remain satisfied with, private employersponsored health insurance.
Corporate America: Friend or foe? Popular analyses of the problems facing
American business in an increasingly competitive global marketplace often point
to the impact of rising health care costs on both the competitiveness of U.S.
products and on corporate profitability. In this view, businesses must pursue a
solution -- any solution -- to bring the cost of employee fringe benefits under
control in order to remain competitive in an environment where firms in other
nations enjoy a distinct advantage as a result of the presence of publicly
sponsored universal health insurance programs which simultaneously relieve
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businesses of the onus of providing health benefits to their employees and
significantly reduce costs compared to the pluralistic, even chaotic nature of the
U.S. health care system. The new conventional wisdom contends that events
over the past decade have brought businesses to a "breaking point", producing a
quiet, but significant change in corporate attitudes towards health care reform.42
While business leaders' dissatisfaction with the present mechanism of
financing health care in the US is indisputable, their willingness to actively lobby
for comprehensive national health insurance reform is less clear. Reformers take
heart that business groups are no longer openly hostile to proposals for systemic
health care reform, but the debate over various "pay or play" proposals
highlights the business community's dilemma in health policy debates.
Although many of the nation's largest corporations and business organizations
favor mandatory employer-sponsored health insurance, small businesses
adamantly oppose the plan. Mandated health benefits present fewer problems
for large corporations, most of whom already provide their employees with
generous fringe benefits. Additional federal mandates, however, have a far
greater impact on small businesses. In a weak economy, providing health
insurance for their workers threatens the continued existence of many small
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firms, many of which presently provide only limited, if any, benefits to their
workers.43
A recent Gallup survey of corporate executives' opinions on health care
reform also provides a less optimistic impression of businesses' willingness to
entertain proposals for fundamental changes to the present US health care
system. On the surface, corporate leaders' support for reform appears strong:
nearly 60% of the executives surveyed listed the cost of health care as a "major
concern" for their firms and more than 80% agreed that "fundamental changes"
were needed to make the US health care system "work better."44 While the vast
majority of business executives favored vague notions of reform, support for
national health insurance dropped when respondents were asked their opinions
about specific policy proposals. Only 8.8% of the CEOs polled endorsed a
proposal to replace the present US health care system with a public health
insurance system, and less than 30% would mandate employers to provide
health benefits to their employees.45 In contrast to those who claim that an
increasingly competitive global marketplace has made business more willing to
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consider national health insurance, 83% of executives believed that businesses,
not government, should continue to provide coverage for basic hospital care and
more than 50% favored a continuation of employer-sponsored coverage of
substance abuse treatment and mental health services.46
The Gallup survey also provides striking evidence that the "rugged
individualism" and traditional skepticism of government intervention in the
economy characteristic of American businessmen is alive and well; 81% of the
executives polled opposed restrictions on the number of physicians entering
medical specialties, while fewer than 30% approved of controlling health care
costs by regulating provider payment or limiting the construction of health
facilities.47 These results, drawn from the largest national survey of CEOs ever
conducted on health care, hardly presents a picture of a business community that
is ripe to be mobilized for the cause of reform.
In addition, reformers who expect business leaders to lead a campaign for
national health insurance underestimate the impact of sectoral, regional, and size
divisions within the business community. While firms' costs for employee
benefits may fall after the introduction of a national health insurance system,
other options exist for private, noncooperative solutions to businesses' health
care costs. By the early 1990s, an increasing number of businesses used selfinsurance, group purchasing, and health care outcomes studies to bargain with
health providers, reflecting a belief that firms should "manage health care like
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any other important component of production."48 This challenge is also evident
in Lawrence Brown and Katherine McLaughlin's recent evaluation of the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation's sponsorship of "community programs for affordable
health care" during the 1980s. Brown and McLaughlin observed that although
corporate executives "know that health care costs too much ... their willingness to
act on the problem usually ends at the benefit manager's door. Endlessly willing
to try to shift costs to employees by "benefit redesign" ... they are generally
unprepared to incur the conflict entailed by tilting against the system."49 Even
in circumstances where business groups collaborate to share information or
lobby government agencies, the absence of strong leadership can derail the best
intentions of corporate executives. The celebrity status accorded to corporate
cost control initiatives in Rochester and Cleveland highlights the unusual (if not
unique) nature of these efforts. Attempts to duplicate their success are likely to
produce far different results in less hospitable climates, for experience at the state
level suggests that the departure of key policy entrepreneurs can shatter fragile
employer coalitions or slow movement towards reform.50
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Finally, those who expect businesses to lead the charge for national health
care reform overlook an important point: while health care costs are rising faster
than those of other inputs, they constitute only one element of firms' variable
costs. Continued health inflation erodes workers' standard of living, but need
not threaten firms' profitability, for rising health care costs have increasingly
been borne by workers, not employers, in the form of higher copayments and
deductibles, fewer covered services, and lower raises. Although self insurance,
managed care, and higher employee cost sharing do little to control systemwide
costs, they offer an appealing alternative to traditional indemnity insurance that
can significantly reduce businesses' exposure to rising health care costs and their
willingness to actively support systemic reform.
Political culture revisited. Some eras are hospitable to reform, others are
not.51 Over the past decade, government regulation and the expansion of
federal authority were viewed with greater hostility than at any time since the
1930s; an activist government was seen as part of the problem, rather than a
solution to national policy dilemmas. Although the campaign against "big
government" first became a prominent theme during Jimmy Carter's successful
presidential bid in 1976, it reached its height under Ronald Reagan, who bashed
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public sector solutions as wasteful, inefficient, and counterproductive
throughout his presidency. Fifteen years of antistatist rhetoric have changed the
political climate in the 1990s. Despite his support for national health insurance,
Bill Clinton's campaign rhetoric echoed many Reaganesque (e.g., Republican)
themes. During the fall campaign, Clinton urged voters to "realize that there is
not a government program for every problem" and argued that the federal
"government is in the way. It has been hijacked by privileged, private
interests."52 The underlying shift in public attitudes towards government make
the introduction of major new federal initiatives such as national health
insurance problematic, particularly given the ideologically charged nature of
public debate over socialized medicine in the past. The diminished appeal of
public sector solutions in recent years has its roots in the public's declining trust
and confidence in political institutions, increased apathy and alienation from
political life, and a sharp rise in public cynicism about government's ability to
effectively manage national problems after the 1970s.53 These sentiments were
evident in exit polls conducted after the 1992 presidential election, which
underscored voters' continuing preference for smaller and less intrusive national
government. Indeed, even among Clinton supporters, expanding public
programs finished a distant second to deficit reduction as the most pressing
problem for the new administration.54 Growing distrust of government, and of
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politicians in general, contrasts strongly with previous eras of social policy
reform, when citizens looked to Washington for leadership.
Weaknesses in the Reform Coalition
The declining fortunes of the American labor movement constitutes
another hurdle to the successful passage of a national health insurance package
in the near future. Labor was buffeted by declining membership, massive layoffs
in blue collar industries, rising concerns over foreign competition and the rise of
"outsourcing" products abroad during the 1980s. Unions remains on the
defensive in the 1990s, as union membership as a percentage of all workers fell
from 20.1% in 1983 to 16.1% in 1991, and the number of work stoppages fell from
more than 300 in 1973 to 40 in 1991.55 In the wake of increasingly active
corporate efforts to decertify unions, discourage strikes, and exact wage and
benefit concessions from employees, labor's political clout is less significant
today than at any point since the 1930s.56 The extent of labor's diminished
influence became apparent during the Spring of 1992, when union supporters
were unable to win passage of one of their top legislative priorities banning
employers from permanently replacing strikers after a "historic" concession
curbing unions' right to strike.57 As one of the most vocal proponents of health
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care reform over the past three decades, labor's hard times do not bode well for
the passage of comprehensive health care reform in the near future.
Despite rising concerns over health care costs, the "crisis" in the health
sector has yet to generate a significant grassroots push for reform.58 While
advocacy groups such as Health Care For All in Massachusetts campaigned for
the passage of state-level programs to improve access to health services,
proposals to cover the uninsured required the support of business and industry
groups, which viewed such efforts as a means to reduce their own expenses for
uncompensated care.59 Although Health Care For All's role in the passage of
universal health insurance legislation in Massachusetts has been cited as
evidence of the power of grassroots political movements to reshape the health
policy agenda, the state's experience since 1988 suggests otherwise. The key
provisions of the Health Security Act remain underfunded, proposed mandates
requiring employers to provide health insurance for their workers were
postponed, and the stringent regulatory controls which governed hospital
reimbursement in the Bay State during the 1980s were abandoned in favor of a
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deregulatory strategy to encourage hospitals to encourage price competition
among health providers.
The Congressional climate. If, as Lynn Etheredge argues, "most of the
federal government's health policy making has been ceded to the legislative
branch" since the enactment of Medicare's prospective payment system in 1982,
proponents of reform have an additional reason for concern about the prospects
for comprehensive reform in the near future.60 Congressional activism on health
policy issues increased markedly during the 1980s, but legislators' renewed
interest in health care issues hardly presages the passage of national health care
reforms designed to expand access to medical services, for the reforms of the past
decade were limited in scope. The introduction of new prospective payment
mechanisms for inpatient hospital services and physician services during the
1980s fundamentally changed the nature of health service delivery, but neither
represented a "liberalization" of federal policy designed to promote access to care
for the uninsured. Indeed, with the exception of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act, federal health policy over the past decade sought to control costs,
not expand coverage.
Instead of promoting access to health services, the reforms of the past
decade limited the federal government's expenditures on health care.61
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Congress was willing to consider incremental modifications to existing
programs, and even risk alienating powerful interest groups, if such reforms
promised to control costs. Even though cost control mechanisms such as
Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital care and
recent reforms in physician payment reduced the federal government's exposure
to health inflation, the prospect for federal officials to risk political capital
controlling systemwide costs to benefit nongovernment payers and consumers
are slim, for such a program would, in fact, be one of the largest "breakthrough"
programs ever proposed. While incremental changes in Medicaid eligibility in
the late 1980s expanded care to previously underserved groups, these changes
involved a minimal commitment of new federal resources. The extent of
Congressional support for liberalizing health care benefits is clear, however, if
we direct our attention to the fate of catastrophic health insurance in the late
1980s, the most significant expansion of Medicare since its inception.
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-360), was an
unmitigated disaster whose impact on health care reform continues to resonate
in Washington long after its repeal. Lawmakers unknowingly unleashed a storm
of protest over the financing of the new benefits, which required beneficiaries to
foot the bill for expanded coverage. While the legislation passed with strong
bipartisan support in both the House and Senate in 1988, elderly Americans were
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outraged that they had to bear the full burden of the new coverage. The
resulting political maelstrom led to calls for repeal soon after the 101st Congress
assembled; in a dramatic reversal, both the House and Senate voted
overwhelmingly to repeal the surtax and most of the additional benefits in
November, 1989. The repeal of P.L. 100-360 was a no win situation which left
many members of Congress licking their wounds. Indeed, Peterson
acknowledges that a "fear of the attentive elderly electorate remains undeniably
palpable in the Senate. When major program expansions are suggested, the
refrain 'Remember Catastrophic!' repeated in one public and private meeting
after another has almost as much rallying power as did 'Remember the Maine!'
during the Spanish-American War."62
The lessons of this "catastrophic" failure are clear: in an effort to enact new
social benefits in an era defined by multibillion dollar budget deficits, Congress
crafted a simple, and intuitively obvious solution--it asked beneficiaries to pay a
share of the cost of the new benefits, and adjusted their cost-sharing to
individuals' incomes. The resulting disaster indicated, among other things, that
the public's desire for reform is an imperfect measure of its willingness to pay for
the costs of reform.63 Although upper income elderly groups were particularly
vocal in their opposition to the Catastrophic Coverage Act, their dissatisfaction
was rooted in an intense dislike for progressive taxation as a financing
mechanism, and was not simply a reaction against user fees or cost sharing.
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Since new taxes or higher marginal tax rates appear to be inevitable in order to
finance coverage for the uninsured under any national health insurance
program, "opposition from the wealthy, who tend to have more political
resources, as well as partisan conflict over such policies," could present a serious
obstacle to devising a workable financing mechanism.64
In addition, the sheer number of proposals also hinders the cause of
reform. The inability to broker an acceptable compromise among competing
proposals hindered the passage of national health insurance during the 1970s,
when proponents were unable to reconcile their differences between competing
alternatives. Similar difficulties surfaced in the 102nd Congress, where members
introduced more than twenty different health care reform bills, ranging from
incremental reforms to the small group insurance market to the creation of a
federally funded single payer national health insurance system. With members
split along both ideological and partisan lines, forging a veto-proof coalition
between the various factions of Congressional health policy reformers (e.g.,
managed competition, mandated benefits, single payer, and incremental reform
strategies) is particularly difficult in the post reform Congress, where members
are rewarded more for policy entrepreneurship than for party loyalty.65 In
addition, the definition of a uniform basic benefits package for any national
health insurance program threatens to pit a multitude of interest groups and
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their legislative supporters against each other. Indeed, various service providers
and medical specialties (e.g., rehabilitation professionals, mental health
providers, and trauma centers) are already lobbying for to include coverage for
their services in various reform proposals.66 Other issues have the potential to
polarize Congressional and public debate over reform. Although previous
debates over national health insurance were often cast in ideological terms, the
Clinton administration's proposal to include coverage for abortion services in the
basic benefits package offered to the public could transform health policy
discussions focus from economic security and individuals' right to health
services into a religious and moral battlefield.67
Finally, several structural changes in Congress make it more difficult to
build lasting coalitions in support of systemic health care reform. First, the
ideological polarization in Congress accelerated during the 1980s, making it
more difficult to craft acceptable compromises on controversial pieces of
legislation. Health care, and particularly national health insurance, divided
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Congress into warring ideological camps during previous eras of reform; with
fewer moderates and pragmatists in present in the contemporary Congress,
conflict, not compromise, characterized recent debates over social policy.68
Second, the post-Watergate reforms in the internal organization and operation of
Congress have created a very different political environment than that which
faced reformers in the 1970s. The creation of the Congressional Budget Office
and dramatic increases in both personal and committee staffs enabled legislators
to play a more proactive role by providing members with alternative sources of
information. The decentralization of both the House leadership and the
explosion in the number of subcommittees over the past two decades present
additional obstacles to reform, for more committees now compete for jurisdiction
over health policy legislation than in the 1970s. While the involvement of the
Democratic leadership in shepherding legislation through the House of
Representatives has increased over the past two decades along with the
ideological homogeneity of the party's membership, the defining feature of the
debate over health care reform in the 102nd Congress was the "absence not only
of a consensus but even of a modal position."69 This dissensus is likely to
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continue despite the Clinton administration's embrace of managed competition,
for policy makers, interest groups, and the public have yet to reach agreement on
either what managed competition should look like in principle or in practice.70
In reaction to domestic policy stalemate, the Democratic leadership in
Congress adopted a confrontational stance towards the White House during the
Reagan and Bush presidencies. Facing the threat of a certain veto on most
proposals for additional federal spending, the Democratic party leadership
sought to win points with the public via symbolic politics: rather than
supporting watered down measures capable of passing the administration's
litmus test, Congress attempted to force the Bush administration to veto popular
legislation on high-visibility issues. The continued stalemate between the
president and Congress on domestic policy issues in recent years has revitalized
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latent concerns about the capability of American political institutions to adapt to
a "new era of coalition government." However, the return to unified party
control in 1992 is unlikely to significantly increase the prospects for health care
reform. Facing small working majorities in both the House and the Senate and
major ideological fissures in the Democratic party ranks, the Clinton
administration's first months bore scant resemblance to traditional presidential
honeymoons. The Clinton administration's first hundred days were
characterized by a siege mentality, as the president's proposal for a broad based
energy tax was withdrawn after opposition from key legislators and the
administration's jobs bill-went down in flames after a successful filibuster in the
Senate. In the end, the impact of unified Democratic control on policy will be
tempered by the "resurgence" of Congress over the past two decades; the era of
divided government during the 1980s merely exacerbated existing propensities
for institutional conflict and policy gridlock.
Divided government and health care reform. Vigorous presidential leadership
and support characterized previous attempts at systemic health care reform:
Harry Truman campaigned aggressively for national health insurance in the
1940s, Lyndon Johnson placed the passage of Medicare and Medicaid at the top
of his legislative agenda in 1965, and various national health insurance proposals
received endorsements from the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations in the
1970s.71 The preceding cases suggest that presidential endorsements, in and of
themselves, are insufficient to bring about reform. Divided government has
become a convenient scapegoat for the gridlock in domestic policy debates over
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the past decade, but unified party control, in and of itself, does not guarantee the
passage of national health insurance; despite the presence of strong Democratic
majorities, neither Franklin Roosevelt nor Jimmy Carter were able to make
meaningful progress towards universal coverage. Furthermore, as David
Mayhew has demonstrated, few significant differences exist in the passage of
significant legislation between periods of divided government and unified party
control.72
Conclusion
While any one of the preceding obstacles could derail the passage of
significant health care reform in the next decade, the confluence of two or more
constitutes a formidable barrier to the enactment of national health insurance in
the near future. Indeed, the present political climate appears to be even less
hospitable to reformers' efforts than that of the 1970s. If past experience is any
guide, neither presidential leadership nor majority control will be sufficient to
pass a national health insurance program in the absence of a solid electoral
mandate. In the past, significant expansions of social benefits required both
strong majorities in Congress and a supportive public. Bill Clinton's victory in
1992, however, was a "brittle" mandate which largely reflected voters'
1dissatisfaction with the economy and other short term factors rather than an
endorsement of the Democratic agenda.73 Indeed, the Clinton administration's
political capital was reflected in the fact that he won a plurality, rather than a
majority, of the presidential vote. While some analysts have argued that taken
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together, Clinton and Ross Perot's share of the popular vote constitutes a
significant mandate for change, a closer analysis of Perot supporters' views
suggests otherwise. In his analysis of post-election exit polls, Ladd found that
Perot voters were "disproportionately libertarian-inclined independents and
Republicans who were angered by government excesses and wanted a more
restricted governmental role."74 As Marmor notes in The Politics of Medicare,
[o]ne of the most important lessons of Medicare's enactment is that
the events surrounding its passage were atypical. The massive
Democratic electoral victories in 1964 created a solid majority in
Congress for the President's social welfare bills, including federal
aid to education, Medicare, and the doubling of the "war on
poverty" effort. To find the most recent precedent, we must go
back almost 30 years, to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal
Congresses.75
The events leading up to the passage of Medicare constitute one possible
path to successful reform, for unified party control and a decisive landslide
victory with a clear campaign theme certainly favor the passage of the
president's program by providing the incoming administration with a surplus of
political capital to draw upon. Landslide elections, however, are few and far
between. As the early years of the Reagan presidency demonstrated, there is
another path to reform; it is possible to build bipartisan Congressional support
for change in a period of divided government. The Reagan administration's
legislative success in 1981 and 1982 undercut the prevailing notion of a
governability crisis in American politics; skillful presidential leadership, coupled
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with a clear linkage between the presidential campaign and the new
administration's legislative agenda created a favorable climate for reform.
Reagan's campaign emphasized cutting taxes, reducing the size of government,
and increasing defense spending to create a "perceived mandate" conducive to
the passage of the administration's agenda in 1981.76 Despite the "mandate for
change" claimed by members of the incoming administration, national health
insurance faces an uncertain future in the 102nd Congress, for despite the recent
surge in legislative interest in health care reform, policy gridlock is unlikely to be
broken without both strong executive leadership and a consensus among public
officials, interest groups, and the mass public on an agenda for reform. In the
absence of this, conflicting trends in public opinion, uneven support from the
business community, continued opposition from health insurers, and
institutional conflict between Congress and the president will perpetuate the
policy stalemate that has frustrated efforts at health care reform for more than a
decade.
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